

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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Remarks

PLEASE PREPARE RESPONSE

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October 31, 1984

Executive Registry

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LEGISLATIVE LIAISON

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Dear Morn:

This is to acknowledge your recent letter on behalf of [redacted] requesting information about the recent reports involving a Central Intelligence Agency document.

As you know, the President ordered an investigation into this matter and until there is a complete report, I cannot offer any comments. I will, however, forward your constituents' inquiries to the Central Intelligence Agency so that they can be contacted when further information is available.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

M. B. Oglesby, Jr.
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Norman F. Lent
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

MBO/KRJ/TJR/tjr

cc: w/copy of inc to Charles A. Briggs, Off
of Legis Liaison, CIA - for DIRECT
response

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LESS REPLY TO THE
WASHINGTON, D.C. OFFICE
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NORMAN F. LENT
4TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

October 26, 1984

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CONTINENTAL SHELF**

COAST GUARD AND NAVIGATION

37
m^o

Mr. M. B. Oglesby
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear B.:

Enclosed please find a copy of a letter which
I have received from [redacted]
New York.

STAT

As you will note, [redacted] is deeply
concerned over the recent disclosure of a Central
Intelligence Agency "primer" regarding activities
in Central America. Any information which you
could provide pertaining to [redacted] concerns
would be appreciated.

STAT

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Thank you in advance for your kind attention
to this matter. I look forward to hearing from
you.

With best wishes I remain,

Sincerely,

[Signature]

NORMAN F. LENT
Member of Congress

NFL/ag

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NEWSDAY MONDAY OCT. 15, 1987

Nicaragua Rebels Said to Get Subversion Manual From CIA

By Robert Parry
The Associated Press

Washington — The CIA produced a psychological warfare manual for Nicaraguan rebels that instructs them to hire professional criminals for "selective jobs" and says some government officials can be "neutralized" with the "selective use of violence," intelligence sources say.

The 90-page manual, written in Spanish, also urges the rebels to create a "martyr" by arranging a violent demonstration that leads to the death of one of their supporters, and it tells how to coerce Nicaraguans into carrying out assignments against their will.

A photostatic copy of the book was obtained by the Associated Press. Its authenticity and the CIA's role in its production were confirmed independently by U.S. intelligence sources who insisted on anonymity.

CIA spokesman George Lauder refused to comment on the manual. After being produced by the CIA about a year ago, the manual entitled "Psychological Operations in Guerrilla War" was distributed inside the Honduran-based Nicaraguan Democratic Force, which is known by its Spanish initials FDN, the sources said.

FDN President Adolfo Calero, whose group is the largest rebel faction, said that he first saw the manual "less than a year ago" and that it was given only to "our top people." He denied that the CIA produced it, claiming it was a "contribution" from a supporter whose name he could not recall. He said the author's name on the cover — "Tayacan" — is a pen-name that means "head man."

Calero said that while the manual presents "some applicable ideas, it also contains some things that we

The book does not use the words "eliminate" or "kill," although references to "danger to other individuals in the area of the target" and "removing likely replacements suggest the goal is to remove the officials physically.

An executive order signed by President Ronald Reagan on Dec. 4, 1981, said the U.S. government employee shall engage in or conspire to engage in assassination" and adds that no intelligence agency "shall participate in or request any person to undertake activities forbidden by this order."

The manual says: "If possible, professional criminals should be hired to carry out specific, selective jobs." The precise nature of those "jobs" is not explained. The manual adds that "specific jobs should be assigned to other

elements, with the goal of creating a martyr for the cause."

The rebels are advised to lead "demonstrators into clashes with the authorities, to provoke riotous shootings, which lead to the killing of one or more persons, who will be seen as the martyrs; this situation should be taken advantage of immediately against the government to create even bigger conflicts."

The manual also instructs the rebels how to coerce Nicaraguans into carrying out assignments against their will. The rebels are told to draw a person into meetings with rebel leaders without him knowing their identities and then threaten to expose him to police "if he fails to cooperate."

The rebels are told that if they shoot a citizen trying to flee, the village

should be told the person was "an enemy of the people" who would have alerted the Sandinistas — prompting government troops to "carry out reprisals such as rape, pillage, destruction, kidnaping and so forth."

One source familiar with the book said the CIA sent the manual to the FDN at about the same time the agency supplied a comic book-style booklet instructing Nicaraguans how to sabotage their government.

That booklet, distributed in northern Nicaragua and also obtained by the Associated Press, urged Nicaraguans to call in sick to work, pour sand into engines, clog toilets and hurl firebombs at police offices and fuel depots. Only 1,000 to 2,000 copies were ever distributed, the source said.

Although Nicaragua's leftist Sandinista government and some Americans living in the country have accused the FDN of murdering and kidnaping civilian officials, it could not be determined if any of the actions recommended by the manual were implemented.

The manual stresses the need for political propaganda in a guerrilla war, and much of it deals with routine psychological operations designed to turn the people against the government. "Guerrilla war is essentially a political war," the book's preface says. "This book is a manual for training guerrillas in psychological operations and their application in the concrete case of the Christian and democratic crusade in which the freedom combatants are engaged in Nicaragua."

It counsels the rebels not to use "explicit terror" against the civilian population because that "could cost support and says they should demonstrate good conduct in dealing with the public. But the manual endorses the "selective use of violence" against Nicaraguan judges, police, and security officials. It says that such people can be "neutralized," but that the targets should be selected carefully based on their unpopularity with the people and the "level of violence necessary to carry out the change."

For psychological effect, it is necessary to take extreme precautions, and it is essential to assemble the townspeople so they gather, take part in the activity and formulate accusations against the oppressor," the manual says.

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NORMAN F. LENT
6TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK

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CONTINENTAL SHELF
COAST GUARD AND NAVIGATION

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

October 22, 1984

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31
m0
Mr. M. B. Oglesby
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear B.:

Enclosed please find a copy of a letter which I have
received from [redacted]
New York.

STAT

As you will note, [redacted] has enclosed
an article regarding the recent disclosure of a CIA
primer regarding Nicaragua. Any information which you
could provide regarding [redacted] concerns
would be appreciated.


STAT

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Thank you in advance for your kind attention to
this matter. I look forward to hearing from you.

With best wishes I remain,

Sincerely,


NORMAN F. LENT
Member of Congress

NFL/ag

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Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 16 — Following are excerpts from "Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare," a primer for Nicaraguan rebels prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency. The document was translated from the Spanish by the Congressional Research Service at the request of the House Select Committee on Intelligence.

Armed Propaganda Teams are formed through a careful selection of persuasive and highly motivated guerrillas who move about within the population, encouraging the people to support the guerrillas and put up resistance against the enemy. It combines a high degree of political awareness and the 'armed' propaganda ability of the guerrillas toward a planned, programmed and controlled effort.

The combatant propagandist guerrillas are the result of a continuous program of indoctrination and motivation. They will have the mission of showing the people how great and fair our movement is in the eyes of all Nicaraguans and the world. Identifying themselves with our people, they will increase the sympathy toward our movement, which will result in greater support of the population for the freedom commandos, reducing support for the regime in power.

Armed propaganda will extend this identification process of the people with the Christian guerrillas, providing converging points against the Sandinista regime.

'Eyes and Ears' of Movement

The Armed Propaganda Teams provide a multistage program of persuasive planning in guerrilla warfare. These teams are also the 'eyes and ears' of our movement.

The development and control of the cover organizations in guerrilla warfare will give our movement the ability to create a "whiplash" effect within the population, when the order for fusion is given. When infiltration and internal subjective control have developed in a manner parallel to other guerrilla activities, a commandante of ours will literally be able to shake up the Sandinista structure, and replace it.

Group discussions raise the spirit and increase the unity of thought in small guerrilla groups and exercise social pressure on the weakest members to better carry out their mission in training and future combat actions.

These group discussions will give special emphasis to creating a favorable opinion of our movement. Through local and national history, make it clear that the Sandinista regime is "foreignizing," "repressive," and "imperialistic," and that, even though there are some Nicaraguans within the Government, they are "puppets" of the power of the Soviets and Cubans, i.e., of foreign power.

'Live and Eat With the People'

To insure popular support, essential for the good development of guerrilla warfare, the leaders should induce a positive interaction between civilians and guerrillas, through the principle of "live, eat and work with the people," and maintain control of their activities. In group discussions, the leaders and political cadres should give emphasis to positively identifying themselves with the people.

It is not recommendable to speak of military tactical plans in discussions with civilians. The Communist enemy should be portrayed mainly as the enemy of the people, and only as a secondary threat to our guerrilla forces.

During patrols and other operations around or in the midst of villages, each guerrilla should be respectful and courteous with the people. In addition he should move with care and always be prepared to fight, if necessary. But he should not view all the people as enemies, with suspicions or hostility. Even in war, it is

ple. The cause of our revolutionary base, the reason why we are struggling is our people. We must be respectful of them on all occasions that present themselves.

Instruction in Use of Arms

In places and situations wherever possible, e.g. when they are resting during the march, the guerrillas can explain the operation of weapons to youths and young men. They can show them an unloaded rifle so that they will learn to load it and unload it, their use, and aiming at imaginary targets.

The guerrillas should always be prepared with simple slogans to explain to the people, whether in an intentional form or by chance, the reason for the weapons:

"The weapons will be for winning freedom; they are for you."

"With weapons we can impose demands such as hospitals, schools, better roads and social services for the people, for you."

"Our weapons are, in truth, the weapons of the people, yours."

"With weapons we can change the Sandino-Communist regime and return to the people a true democracy so that we will all have economic opportunities."

Identification With the People

All of this should be designed to create an identification of the people with the weapons and the guerrillas who carry them. Finally, we should make the people feel that we are thinking of them and that the weapons are the people's, to help them and protect them from a Communist, totalitarian, imperialist regime, indifferent to the needs of the population.

A guerrilla armed force always involves implicit terror because the population, without saying it aloud, fears that the weapons may be used against them. However, if the terror does not become explicit, positive results can be expected.

In a revolution, the individual lives under a constant threat of physical harm. If the Government police cannot put an end to the guerrilla activities, the population will lose confidence in the Government, which has the inherent mission of guaranteeing the safety of citizens. However, the guerrillas should be careful not to become an explicit terror, because this would result in a loss of popular support.

Instructions of Final Statement

When a meeting is held, conclude it with a statement to the effect that people can reveal everything about this visit of our commandos, because we are not afraid of anything or anyone, neither the Soviets nor the Cubans. Emphasize that we are Nicaraguans, that we are fighting for the freedom of Nicaragua and to establish a genuinely Nicaraguan Government.

Armed propaganda in populated areas should not give the impression that weapons are the power of the guerrillas over the people, but rather that the weapons are the strength of the people against a regime of repression.

Whenever it is necessary to use armed force in an occupation or visit to a town or village, guerrillas should emphasize that:

"This is being done to protect them, the people, and not the guerrillas themselves."

"The action, though not desirable, is necessary because the final objective of the insurrection is a free and democratic society, where acts of force will no longer be necessary."

"The force of weapons is a necessity caused by the oppressive system, and will cease to exist when the 'forces of justice' of our movement assume control."

How to Explain a Shooting

If, for example, it should be necessary for one of the advance posts to have to fire on a citizen who was trying to leave the town or city in which the guerrillas are carrying out armed propaganda or political propaganda, the following is recommended:

ed:

"Explain that if that citizen had managed to escape, he would have alerted the enemy that is near the town or city, and they would carry out acts of reprisal such as rapes, pillage, destruction, captures, etc., in this way terrorizing the inhabitants of the place for having given attention and hospitality to the guerrillas."

"If a guerrilla fires at an individual, make the town see that he was an enemy of the people, and that they shot him because the guerrillas recognized as their first duty the protection of citizens."

"Make the population see that it was the repressive system of the regime that was the cause of this situation, what really killed the informer, and that the weapon fired was one recovered in combat against the Sandinista regime."

How to Neutralize Targets

It is possible to neutralize carefully selected and planned targets, such as court judges, police and state security officials, etc. For psychological purposes, it is necessary to take extreme precautions, and it is absolutely necessary to gather together the population affected, so that they will be present, take part in the act, and formulate accusations against the oppressor.

The target or person should be chosen on the basis of:

"The spontaneous hostility that the majority of the population feels toward the target."

"Rejection or potential hatred by the majority of the population toward the target, stirring up the population and making them see all the negative and hostile actions of the individual against the people."

If the majority of the people give their support or backing to the target or subject, do not try to change these sentiments through provocation.

After Removal of Target

The mission to replace the individual should be followed by:

"Extensive explanation within the population affected of the reason why it was necessary for the good of the people."

"An explanation that Sandinista retaliation is unjust, indiscriminate and, above all, a justification for the execution of this mission."

"Infiltration of guerrilla cadres (whether a member of our movement or outside element) in workers unions, student groups, peasant organizations, etc., preconditioning these groups for behavior within the masses, where they will have to carry out proselitism for the insurrectional struggle in a clandestine manner."

Our psychological war team should prepare in advance a hostile mental attitude among the target groups, so that at the decisive moment they can turn their furor into violence, demanding their rights that have been trampled upon by the regime."

The Preconditioning Campaigns

These preconditioning campaigns must be aimed at the political parties, professional organizations, students, laborers, the masses of the unemployed, the ethnic minorities and any other sector of society that is vulnerable or recruitable; this also includes the popular masses and sympathizers of our movement.

Make it plain to people that they have become slaves, that they are being exploited by privileged military and political groups.

The foreign advisers and their counseling programs are in reality "interventionists" in our homeland who direct the exploitation of the nation in accordance with the objectives of the Russian and Cuban Imperialists, in order to turn our people into slaves of the hammer and sickle.

When the mass uprising is being developed, our covert cadres should make partial demands, initially demanding, e.g., "We want food. We want freedom of worship. We want union freedom," steps that will lead us toward the realization of the goals of our movement, which are: God, peace, justice, and freedom.

A. Primer Tells Nicaraguan Rebels How to Kill

By JOEL BRINKLEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 16 — A Central Intelligence Agency document that became public this week tells Nicaraguan rebels how to win popular support and gives advice on political assassination, blackmail and mob violence.

The 44-page booklet, titled "Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare," is a primer on insurgency. Most activity of this sort in Nicaragua has been paid for by the United States through the C.I.A.

The primer explains how to kidnap and kill officials, blow up public buildings and blackmail ordinary citizens.

The White House had no comment on the document today. But at least one member of Congress said he was calling for an investigation.

Representative Thomas J. Downey, New York Democrat, said he wrote to the House Select Committee on Intelli-

Excerpts from primer, page A12.

gence today, asking for a hearing when the new Congress convenes next year.

"Is it the position of our Government to hire killers?" he wrote. "This runs counter to the President's directive condemning terrorism, and I want to

know how high up in the Administration this goes."

A copy of the primer was first obtained by The Associated Press and intelligence officials confirmed that the C.I.A. had written it. An agency spokesman declined comment.

The primer consists of chapters describing the steps of building a guerrilla force. It is written as if it were written by a Nicaraguan taking up arms along with the guerrillas.

The author advises guerrillas to "precondition the masses to believe" that "foreign advisers and their counseling programs are in reality 'interventionists' in our homeland who direct the exploitation of our nation." The advice alludes to the Nicaraguan Government's Cuban advisers. Some residents of the region have said that it is the C.I.A. that intervenes.

The primer leads "the guerrilla student" through five phases of preparing for and carrying out a guerrilla war, and it includes two diagrams. One demonstrates the arrangement of self-reinforcing guerrilla cells, and the other shows how operations should be carried out in a hypothetical region.

The following, taken from the primer, is an abbreviated version of the guerrilla warfare course:

The guerrilla is first turned into a propagandist through small group discussions, designed to "create a favorable impression of our movement."

Guerrilla leaders direct the discussions, leading the fledgling guerrillas "to reach a correct conclusion" al-

Continued on Page A12, Column 4

C.I.A. Primer Tells Nicaraguan Rebels How to Kill

Continued From Page A1

though "the guerrillas should feel that it was their free and own decision."

Guerrillas should explain to the people that "our struggle is not against the nationals but rather against Russian imperialists." All of that "will foster the sympathy of the peasants, and they will immediately become one of us."

Once the guerrillas are indoctrinated, the course moves to "armed propaganda," meaning actual warfare.

Visit to a Town Depicted

Guerrillas are advised to "occupy a town or small city which is neutral or relatively passive in the conflict." Immediately on arrival, the guerrillas should take these steps:

1. "Destroy the military or police installations and remove survivors to a public place."

2. "Cut all outside lines of communication."

3. "Establish a public tribunal" where the guerrillas "ashame, ridicule and humiliate" Sandinistas and sympathizers, "shouting slogans and jeers."

4. "Make 'courtesy visits' to the town's 'prominent people, such as doctors, priests and teachers.'"

If "it becomes necessary" to shoot a citizen who is "trying to leave the town," guerrillas should explain that "he was an enemy of the people" who would have "alerted the enemy" so that the Sandinistas could "carry out acts of reprisals, such as rapes, pillage, destruction, captures, etc."

'Neutralizing' Public Officials

The final lesson in the armed propaganda chapter, titled "Selective Use of Violence," involves "neutralizing" selected public officials. The lesson stresses that "it is absolutely necessary to gather together the population affected, so that they will be present and take part in the act."

After the official is publicly "neutral-

ized," guerrillas should offer "extensive explanation" of "why it was necessary for the good of the people" and then "choose carefully" the person "who will replace the target."

In Chapter 3, guerrillas are taught the function of "armed propaganda teams." These are recruiters who visit villages to "exploit the socio-political weaknesses in the target society."

At first, each team member should be "courteous and humble" and should "mix in with the community," attending birthdays, parties and funerals. If "one or two men" are hostile, that "can be overcome by eliminating the enemy in a rapid and effective manner."

Initially members of propaganda teams "should not mention their political ideology." Instead they should elicit concern by telling workers that "the state is putting an end to factories" and doctors that "they are being replaced with Cuban paramedics."

As soon as the guerrillas learn the aspirations of the local people, they should say that joining the insurrection is the way to see those desires realized.

The chapter calls for short visits, no longer than three days, on the ground that longer visits "would overexpose the target audience and cause a negative reaction."

Guerrillas next learn how to blackmail citizens so they can be used as informants.

"Meetings with the guerrilla leaders can be arranged to seem casual," the primer says. "The meeting will be held so that other people know that the target is attending them. The target then is faced with his participation in the insurrectional struggle, and it will be indicated to him that if he fails to cooperate or carry out future orders, he will be exposed."

If the target still decides not to join, guerrillas should denounce the target to the police using "false statements from citizens." If targets do join, they will be used "for subjective internal

control of groups to which they already belong."

All of this is to "prepare in advance a hostile mental attitude among the target groups so that, at the decisive moment, they will erupt in general violence."

When the uprising occurs, "professional criminals should be hired to carry out selective jobs," such as "taking the demonstrators to a confrontation with the authorities to bring about uprisings and shootings that will cause the death of one or more people to create a martyr for the cause."

Other people will be "armed with clubs, iron rods and placards and, if possible, small firearms, which they will carry hidden." Still other "shock troops," equipped "with knives, razors, chains, clubs and bludgeons," will "march slightly behind the innocent and gullible participants" as the uprising progresses.

When the "concentration reaches its highest level of euphoria or popular discontent," the guerrilla commander, watching from a high vantage point, will order his men to begin chanting anti-Sandinista slogans. The commander "can change slogans" as the rioting progresses "and eventually incite violence if he wishes."

That will give the impression that there are many guerrillas and that "they have a large popular backing."

Curse in Kenya Is Penalized

NAIROBI, Kenya, Oct. 16 (UPI) — The police arrested two officials of the Mwangeka soccer team on Sunday for using bird feathers and other "witchcraft paraphernalia" to put a curse on the opposition goalkeeper. The Kenyan News Agency said today that the incident took place during a game in the village of Wundanyi in western Kenya. Mwangeka won 4 to 3 but the result was nullified by the Kenya Football Federation, which ordered the game re-